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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
v. 
NELSON RODRIGUEZ-LOPI 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 960665-CA 
Priority No. 2 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STOP OF RODRIGUEZ'S TRUCK WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
REASONABLE SUSPICION AND THUS ALL EVIDENCE SEIZED PURSUANT 
TO THE STOP IS INADMISSIBLE. 
The State asserts that the officers acted upon reasonable 
suspicion in stopping Rodriguez, noting the early hour, closeness 
to the curb, slow rate of speed in an area known for 
prostitution, the fact that both men in the truck were leaned 
over toward two women walking up the Street, and that one of the 
officers knew the women to be prostitutes. See R.B. at 10-14. 
However, the given circumstances do not support a reasonable 
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. This Court has 
repeatedly held that travel at a suspicious time and place alone 
is insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. See State v. 
Sykes, 840 P.2d 825 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Seward, 806 P.2d 
213 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Truiillo. 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App., 
1987). Even under the most suspect of circumstances, and where 
the suspect's activity suggests criminal behavior, this Court has 
held that the reasonable suspicion is lacking where there is mere 
conjecture as to the "connection between defendant and the 
illegal activity" without other "positive evidence linking the 
[defendant] to the illegal act." Sykes, 840 P.2d at 828-29. 
Accordingly, in Sykes, this Court found reasonable suspicion 
lacking where an officer stopped defendant based on an 
observation of defendant driving up to house who entered and left 
in a short time period, knowledge that neighbors complained about 
incessant coming and going from that house, the fact that the 
officer had made a purchase in the general area, plus unspecified 
information from a confidential informant. Sykes, 840 P.2d at 
828. Likewise in Truiillo, this Court held that reasonable 
suspicion did not exist where the officer stopped the defendant 
because he was walking at a late hour in a high crime area and 
that he appeared nervous and let go of his knapsack when the 
officer approached. Truiillo, 739 P.2d at 90; see also Steward, 
806 P.2d at 216 (holding no reasonable suspicion based on driving 
on public road at late hour). 
The stop at issue in this case is analogous to the 
unreasonable stops in Sykes, Trujillo, and Steward in that there 
are no positive factors linking Rodriguez to criminal activity. 
First, there were no indications that a solicitation was 
occurring or about to occur. Rodriguez continued to drive as he 
passed the women, albeit at a slow speed; he did not stop. 
Record ("R.") 166, 168, 183. At ten miles per hour, he would be 
rapidly overcoming the walking women, leaving no time to strike a 
deal. The officers did not observe the women act as if they were 
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responding to an offer (i.e. approach the car, get in the car). 
The officers merely observed that Rodriguez's passenger was 
talking to the women; the officers could not overhear the 
conversation, however. R. 161, 182. Talking to women, even if 
they are prostitutes, is not illegal. See State v. Munsen, 821 
P.2d 13, 15 (Utah App. 1991) (defendants proximity to another who 
was removing stereo from car parked in empty lot at late hour did 
not support reasonable suspicion) (citing Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 
U.S. 85, 91 (1979)("person's mere propinquity to others 
independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without 
more, give rise to probable cause to search the person"); Brown 
v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1979)(mere presence in area 
frequented by drug users does not support reasonable suspicion); 
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991) (no reasonable 
suspicion where man walking near defendant ran away)). Without 
other objective manifestations of solicitation (i.e. stopping the 
car) the officers did not have a reasonable suspicion that 
Rodriguez was up to something more than innocent activity. 
Other factors bear against the finding of reasonable 
suspicion. With regard to the early hour and the location, many 
neighborhoods surround the particular area of State Street where 
Rodriguez was stopped. Moreover, many people go to work at an 
early hour. It would not be unusual, therefore, for people to be 
driving to work at the same time and through the same area. As -
to the slow speed, as discussed above, it is not a crime, nor is 
it extraordinary, that two young men slow down to talk to two 
3 
women walking, even if the women are prostitutes. This is 
especially true where prostitutes (assuming the women were 
prostitutes) are normally enticingly dressed. 
Finally, the State's assertion that the stop was legally 
premised on a reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation is 
unsupported in case law. R.B. 13. The facts do not suggest that 
Rodriguez was driving under the influence. The officers 
testified that he maintained a constant course and speed, albeit 
to the right of the lane. R. 161-68, 182-83. Contrary to the 
weaving and erratic driving pattern of one under the influence, 
Rodriguez maintained control of his car. See Sandy City v. 
Thorsness, 778 P.2d 1011 (Utah App. 1989)(no reasonable suspicion 
of DUI in absence of reckless or erratic driving). Consequently, 
Officer Farris' claim that the stop was premised on a suspicion 
of a possible DUI is disingenuous, as well as unfounded under 
Utah law. R. 161; A.B. 13-14. 
The State maintains that "these facts may not, like 
Thorsness, suggest a possible DUI, [however] they are indicative 
of a lane violation and/or reckless driving." R.B. 13 (citing 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-61(1) (lane violation), 41-6-45 (reckless 
driving) (1993)). As to a possible lane violation, Section 41-6-
61(1) provides that "[a] vehicle shall be operated as nearly as 
practical entirely within a single lane." Rodriguez was, in 
fact, driving within the lane of travel. Rodriguez was not 
driving in the gutter or on the sidewalk, but rather remained on 
the paved portion of the road at all times. R. 161-68, 182-83. 
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The State claims that Rodriguez was driving in an "unauthorized 
travel lane.1' R.B. 13. However, where the street did not 
otherwise bear parking area markings, such as signs or painted 
lines on the road, Rodriguez was driving in accordance with 
Section 41-6-61(1). Specifically, Rodriguez was driving "within 
a single lane." Accordingly, the stop was not legally premised 
on a violation of Section 41-6-61(1). 
With regard to possible reckless driving, Section 41-6-45 
provides that "any person who operates a vehicle in willful or 
wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty 
of reckless driving." Rodriguez did not exhibit "willful or 
wanton disregard" for safety merely by driving slowly to the 
right of the lane. Rodriguez did not endanger himself, his 
passenger or any one else by his actions nor did he threaten 
anyone's property. The officers did not note that he was holding 
other traffic up or otherwise causing a road hazard to 
pedestrians or drivers. In fact, there were likely few people on 
the road at the early morning hour when the incident occurred. 
As discussed above, Rodriguez's apparent control over his truck 
indicates that he did not wantonly or willfully endanger persons 
or property in violation of Section 41-6-45. Accordingly, a stop 
premised on a possible reckless driving violation was not 
supported by a reasonable suspicion. 
In light of the foregoing, reasonable suspicion was lacking 
where the officers did not articulate other manifestations of 
either solicitation or a traffic violation. To find otherwise 
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would open the door for intrusion upon the innocent traveler who, 
at the wrong place and time, gratuitously slows down to talk to a 
girl. While polite society does not smile upon such behavior, 
our laws and constitution protect the privacy of individuals who 
engage in these acts. Absent other objective manifestations of 
criminal activity, the officers were not justified in their 
suspicions, but rather acted upon unconstitutional hunches. 
II. THE TOXICOLOGY REPORT IS NOT RELIABLE HEARSAY FOR 
PURPOSES OF THE PRELIMINARY HEARING: ABSENT THE REPORT, THE 
PRELIMINARY HEARING MAGISTRATE LACKED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT THE BINDOVER. 
A. THE STATE PROFFERS AN OVER BROAD DEFINITION OF "RELIABLE 
HEARSAY" FOR PURPOSES OF A PRELIMINARY HEARING. 
The State notes that reliable hearsay is admissible at a 
preliminary hearing. See Respondent's Brief ("R.B.") 16. 
However, the State offers a definition of "reliable hearsay" that 
is overbroad, misconstrued and disregards statutory language and 
case law mandating that the rules of evidence are determinative 
of "reliable hearsay" at a preliminary hearing. 
The State draws its definition of "reliable hearsay" from 
the Rights of Crime Victims Act ("Act"). R.B. 16. The Act 
defines "reliable hearsay" as "'information worthy of confidence, 
including any information whose use at sentencing is permitted by 
the United States Constitution.'" See Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-
2(4) (1995). The State also asserts that "'[h]earsay evidence is 
freely permitted by the [U.S.] Constitution at sentencing," and 
thus implies that "reliable hearsay" should be construed to 
permit a wide scope of hearsay evidence at a preliminary hearing. 
6 
R.B. 16-17 (quotation omitted). 
In fact, hearsay evidence is not "freely permitted" at 
federal sentencing hearings. As a matter of due process, certain 
standards of reliability must be met before hearsay may be 
considered. First, hearsay must be sufficiently reliable to 
support its probable accuracy. See United States v. Farnsworth, 
92 F.3d 1001, 1010 (10th Cir. 1996). The defendant must also 
have a reasonable opportunity to rebut the hearsay evidence. See 
United States v. Arthur Barnes, 1997 WL 311569 *8 (7th Cir 1997) . 
Hearsay is not otherwise admissible. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064 
(Utah 1993), applied a similar reliability standard with regard 
to hearsay evidence presented at sentencing. The Johnson Court 
thus held that a sentencing judge erred in considering "highly 
unreliable" evidence consisting of double and triple hearsay 
alleging that the defendant sexually abused a child. Id. at 
1072-73. "To require a defendant to assume the burden of 
disproving highly unreliable evidence might well violate due 
process." Id. at 1073 (citing State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 
(Utah 1985); State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Utah 1982); 
State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1248 (Utah 1980)). In light of 
the foregoing, the State's broad interpretation of the Act's 
definition of "reliable hearsay" is a misstatement of the law 
that disregards the due process concerns inherent in "freely 
permitt[ing]" hearsay evidence in a criminal proceeding. 
The State's reliance on the Crime Victims Act is further 
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misplaced given the legislative purpose underlying the Act and 
the constituent constitutional amendment to Article I, Section 
12. Article I, § 12, as amended, provides in part, "[n]othing in 
this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay 
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any 
preliminary examination to determine probable cause." The 
amendment's proponents made constant reference to rights of crime 
victims, especially victims of rape and child abuse, in arguing 
that the amendment would spare victims the trauma of having to 
face the perpetrator at the preliminary hearing. See Utah Senate 
Floor Debates, Tape # 28, Feb. 16, 1994 (Day 31), p.m. session 
(debating definition of "reliable hearsay" under constitutional 
amendment; Utah House Floor Debates, Tape # 1 & 2, Mar. 2, 1994 
(Day 45) (same). 
The instant case, by contrast, does not involve a human 
victim akin to the vulnerable rape or incest victim contemplated 
by the proponents of Article I, §12. Rather, this case involves 
a cold report. The purpose of the Act, as implemented through 
Article I, § 12, is not served by adopting the Act's definition 
of "reliable hearsay" for purposes of the admissibility of the 
report at issue in this case. There is no victim to spare from 
the sort of probing, insensitive inquiry that compromises the 
victim's right to be involved in the criminal process in the 
"least traumatic, intrusive, or intimidating manner." Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-37-1(2) (1995) (stating legislative intent behind 
victims' rights). 
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Finally, the State's definition disregards statutory and 
case law directing that the rules of evidence define "reliable 
hearsay, ,! as well as qualifying language within Article I, § 12 
expressly directing that "reliable hearsay" is to be defined by 
"statute or rule." See Appellant's Brief ("A.B.") 17-22. In 
light of the language of Article I, § 12, statutory and case law, 
the Utah Rules of Evidence are the appropriate index of reliable 
hearsay for preliminary hearing purposes. 
B. THE RULES OF EVIDENCE ARE DETERMINATIVE OF "RELIABLE 
HEARSAY" FOR PURPOSES OF A PRELIMINARY HEARING AND SERVE TO 
PROTECT A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR PROCEEDING. 
The State asserts that evidence rules are inapplicable to 
preliminary hearings, citing Yacht Club v. Utah Liquor Control 
Com'n, 681 P.2d 1224 (Utah 1984). R.B. 17. The State's reliance 
upon Yacht Club is misplaced. First, Article I, § 12, court 
rules and case law provide that the rules of evidence govern, and 
are thus determinative of "reliable hearsay", at a preliminary 
hearing. See A.B. 17-22. 
Second, Yacht Club involves an administrative proceeding, 
which is qualitatively different from the criminal nature of a 
preliminary hearing. Utah has "long recognized that there are 
significant differences between court trials and proceedings 
before administrative agencies." Yacht Club, 681 P.2d at 1226. 
"It is undisputable that the legislature intended that the latter 
should not be burdened with undue formality." Lake Shore Motor 
Coach Lines, Inc. v. Welling, 339 P.2d 1011, 1013-14 (Utah 1959). 
Hence, the rules of evidence are inapplicable at administrative 
,9 
hearings. Id. at 1014. 
Preliminary hearings, by contrast, are characterized as a 
"critical stage" of a criminal proceeding, "adversarial" in 
nature. See State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 782 n.9 (Utah 
1980)(citing Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1969)); State v. 
Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995); State v. Brickey, 714 
P.2d 644, 646 (Utah 1986); Kearns-Tribune Corp., Publisher of 
Salt Lake Tribune v. Lewis, 685 P.2d 515, 520 (Utah 1984). 
"While the preliminary hearing is not a full-blown determination 
of an accused's guilt or innocence, it is [] a 'critical stage' 
in the criminal process" to the extent that it operates as a 
means of discovery and preservation. Brickey, 714 P.2d at 646; 
State v. Willet, 909 P.2d 218, 222 (Utah 1995) (cross-
examination of witness at preliminary hearing may provide 
testimony admissible at trial to bolster or attack credibility). 
Hence, "proper consideration for a defendant's constitutional 
rights must be observed." Brickey, 714 P.2d at 646.x 
1
 Utah's characterization of the preliminary examination as 
a critical stage is supported by United States Supreme Court 
precedent. In Coleman, the Court held that a preliminary hearing 
is a "critical stage" where the hearing involves discovery and 
preservation of evidence, and thus poses "potential substantial 
prejudice to [the] defendant." Coleman, 399 U.S. at 9-10 
(defendant entitled to counsel at preliminary hearing). Likewise 
in Gerstein v. Puah, 420 U.S. 103, 122, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 
54 (1975), which held that a Fourth Amendment probable cause 
determination was not a critical stage, the Court again 
acknowledged the critical nature of adversarial preliminary 
hearings, akin to the hearing at issue in Coleman and Utah 
hearings, which serve as tools of discovery and preservation. 
Id. at 122-23. Accordingly, the Gerstein Court limited its 
decision to Fourth Amendment probable cause determinations, 
distinguishing such determinations from the adversarial 
preliminary hearing at issue in Coleman. Id. at 123. "The 
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Utah law regarding sentencing is instructive as to the scope 
of rights afforded at a preliminary hearing since both sentencing 
and preliminary hearings are critical stages in which fundamental 
fairness concerns are observed. The Johnson Court held that 
"hearsay evidence presented must bear "'sufficient indicia of 
reliability to support its probable accuracy.'" Johnson, 856 
P.2d at 1072. Likewise, the defendant must also enjoy the" right 
to be confronted by the witnesses against him." State v. Lipsky, 
608 P.2d 1241, 1248 n.ll (Utah 1980)(citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 
U.S. 400 (1965)). These due process protections, afforded a 
defendant at the sentencing phase by virtue of its "critical" 
nature, must naturally extend to the preliminary examination, 
also a "critical stage." 
On account of the due process and confrontation rights 
afforded at preliminary hearings, the evidentiary rules are the 
necessary index of reliable hearsay to the extent that they serve 
as procedural protections of such rights, especially 
confrontation rights. See Anderson, 612 P.2d at 785 
("evidentiary rules excluding hearsay" preserve confrontation 
rights); see, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 
(1970)("although not co-extensive, hearsay rules and the 
Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar 
values"). A brief overview of the purpose of confrontation 
rights is helpful in appreciating how evidence rules function as 
Fourth Amendment probable cause determination is addressed only 
to pretrial custody" and thus serves a "limited function and [has 
a] nonadversary character." Id. at 122-23. 
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procedural protections. 
Confrontation: (1) insures that the witness will give his 
statements under oath - thus impressing him with the 
seriousness of the matter and guarding against the lie by 
the possibility of a penalty for perjury; (2) forces the 
witness to submit to cross-examination, the "greatest legal 
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth"; (3) 
permits the jury that is to decide the defendant's fate to 
observe the demeanor of the witness in making his statement, 
thus aiding the jury in assessing his credibility. 
Green, 399 U.S. at 158 (quotation omitted). To this end, the 
evidentiary hearsay exceptions are circumscribed by Confrontation 
Clause rights. See Green, 399 U.S. at 155. 
Accordingly, the hearsay exceptions define reliable 
information for purposes of confrontation rights. Ohio v. 
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)("reliability can be inferred . . . 
where evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception"); 
see also State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1986)("exceptions 
to the [hearsay] rule have evolved to permit the admission of 
evidence that is deemed reliable notwithstanding its failure to 
satisfy the hearsay rule"). As explained in Roberts: 
[Reflecting its underlying purpose to augment accuracy in 
the factfinding process by ensuring the defendant an 
effective means to test adverse evidence, the 
[Confrontation] Clause countenances only hearsay marked with 
such trustworthiness that "there is no material departure 
from the reason of the general rule [that hearsay evidence 
is inadmissible]. 
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 (quotation omitted). 
Under these principles, the hearsay exceptions represent the 
lowest level of reliability constitutionally allowed. The 
evidence rules and confrontation rights are not coextensive, and 
hearsay evidence which falls under a hearsay rule is legally 
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admissible even though such evidence contravenes confrontation 
rights. Green, 399 U.S. at 156. To fall below this already 
minimized level of protection would be a "'material departure 
from the reason of the rule'" such that the admission of the 
evidence would no longer be compatible with confrontation 
rights. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 (quoting Snyder v. 
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934)); see also Green, 399 U.S. at 
156 (!l[g]iven similarity of the values protected", changes in 
current hearsay rules raise questions of "compatibility" with 
confrontation rights). 
In light of the foregoing, the State's assertion that the 
rules of evidence are inapplicable to preliminary hearings is 
incorrect. The evidentiary rules govern preliminary hearings 
pursuant to Article I, § 12, as well as statutory and case law. 
The rules of evidence are thus determinative of "reliable 
hearsay" at a preliminary hearing. Further, the nature of a 
preliminary hearing, a critical, adversarial stage in a criminal 
proceeding that serves as a discovery and preservation device, 
demands that the defendant be afforded certain due process 
protections to ensure the probable accuracy of the evidence 
against him, as well as a reasonable opportunity to confront such 
evidence. Insofar as evidentiary rules embody this minimum level 
of protection, they are determinative of "reliable hearsay." 
C. THE TOXICOLOGY REPORT IS UNRELIABLE HEARSAY NOT WITHIN 
ANY HEARSAY EXCEPTION AND LACKS FOUNDATION WHICH MIGHT 
OTHERWISE ESTABLISH ITS RELIABILITY. 
The State asserts that the report is admissible as a public 
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record under Rule 803(8) (B), Utah R. Evid. (1997) . However, the 
report does not fall under any hearsay exception such that it 
amounts to "reliable hearsay" for preliminary hearing purposes, 
nor does the report bear other "particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness" that might otherwise establish its reliability. 
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 67. 
In United State v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977), the 
Second Circuit held a lab report, prepared by a U.S. Customs 
Service chemisi, was inadmissible as a public record where the 
preparer was not available to testify and the report constituted 
a factual finding resulting from an investigation made pursuant 
to statutory authority. Id. at 66-67 (citing Rules 803(8) (B) 
Fed. R. Evid.) . The Court relied on the language of 803(8) (B) , 
which expressly excludes reports generated in criminal cases by 
"police officers or other law enforcement personnel." Id. at 67 
(quoting Rule 803(8)(B), Fed. R. Evid.). The Court also reviewed 
the legislative intent behind hearsay rules, noting that the 
drafters were aware of "developments concerning the right to 
confrontation" and sought to "eliminate . . . tension between the 
hearsay rule[s] . . . and the confrontation clause." Id. at 66, 
78 (citing Advisory Committee Notes on the Rules of Evidence, 56 
F.R.D. 183 (1972) ) . 
In light of 803(8)(B) and the legislative intent, the Court 
found the preparing chemist to be "other law enforcement 
personnel" for purposes of the 803(8) (b) exclusion. Id. at 68. 
The Court noted that the chemist was a full-time Customs employee 
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empowered with law enforcement authority; that the chemist 
received the unidentified substance from other Customs agents for 
the purpose of identifying it pursuant to his regular duty; that 
the resulting report would be used in the eventual prosecution of 
the offender; and that the chemist, in addition to all other 
duties in anticipation of prosecution, would likely testify "as 
an important prosecution witness" at trial regarding the test 
results. Id. at 68. 
In short, these reports are not "made by persons and for 
purposes unconnected with a criminal case (but rather they 
are a direct) result of a test made for the specific purpose 
of convicting the defendant and conducted by agents of the 
executive branch, the very department of the government 
which seeks defendant's conviction." 
Id. (quotation omitted). 
Under Oates, the report at issue here is inadmissible under 
Utah Rule 803(8) (B) , Utah R. Evid., which is identical to the 
federal rule applied in Oates. See A.B. 25-32. As the State 
concedes, the report was prepared by a chemist from the state 
crime lab, an employee of a police department instrumentality 
whose express function is to test substances for purposes of 
prosecuting crime. See R.B. 18; Utah Code Ann. § 53-5-104 (5)- (6) 
(Supp. 1997) . In addition, the report was admitted without the 
testimony of the preparer. Accordingly, the report is excluded 
by the express terms of 803(8) (B) and Oates where the chemist is 
not otherwise available to testify. 
The State asserts that toxicology reports are admissible as 
public records under Yacht Club. See R.B. 17 (citing Yacht Club, 
681 P.2d at 1227. The State further notes that Oates 
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"restrictive view has been criticized," stating "a toxicology 
result is the type of routine matter to which the public records 
exception to the hearsay rule typically applies." R.B. 21. 
According to the State, "crime laboratory reports generally 
follow a routine manner of preparation," hence "''the factors 
likely to cloud the perception of an official engaged in the more 
traditional law enforcement functions of observation and 
investigation of crime simply are not present.''" R.B. at 19 
(quoting State v. Christian, 895 P.2d 676, 682 (N.M. App. 1995), 
cert, denied, 892 P.2d 961 (N.M. 1995)(quoting United States v. 
Ouezada. 754 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1985)). 
Although Utah Courts have not addressed the admissibility in 
a criminal matter of police reports under 803(8) (B) directly, 
this Court has expressed its agreement with the more stringent 
Oates rationale in Kehl v. Schwendiman. 735 P.2d 413 (Utah App. 
1987) and Layton City v. Peronek, 803 P.2d 1294 (Utah App. 1990). 
In Peronek, this Court opined that although a jail incident 
report might be admissible under the business record exception, 
it would nonetheless be excluded under 803(8) (B) since it was an 
"investigatory report expected to lead to some form of 
prosecutorial action." Id. at 1298. Likewise in Kehl, the Court 
stated that a DUI report "proffered by the state in a criminal 
prosecution, even with the proper 'reliability7 affidavits, [] 
would clearly be inadmissible under the public records 
exception." Id. at 417 n.7 (holding DUI report inadmissible as 
public for lack of foundation; citing Utah R. Evid. 803(8) (B) ) . 
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Peronek, Kehl and other decisions echo the concerns 
expressed in Oates regarding the risks to a defendant's 
confrontation rights when reports prepared by a law enforcement 
agency are admitted against a defendant, namely concerns of 
reliability and independent analysis. 
In most cases dealing with police reports of a criminal 
investigation, it is apparent that the reports are made in 
part in contemplation of litigation. Although the reports 
may not be readily describable as "dripping with motivation 
to misrepresent," their exclusion is more fundamentally 
explainable on the ground that the substantial rights under 
the confrontation clause of the United States Constitution, 
and especially the right of cross-examination, may be 
severely prejudiced when the information in the report calls 
into question the motivation and the accuracy of the 
perception, recall, the manner of the language usage, or the 
soundness of the conclusions by the author of the report. 
State v. Bertul. 664 P.2d 1181, 1186 (Utah 1983); see Peronek, 
803 P.2d at 1299 (jail incident report admitted without testimony 
of preparer violated due process confrontation rights). Given 
Utah's high regard for a defendant's confrontation rights, the 
State's assertion that Oates' "restrictive view" is not 
instructive is not well-founded. Indeed, Oates mirrors Utah law 
in preserving a defendant's confrontation rights by excluding law 
enforcement reports, prepared in anticipation of litigation, or 
when such reports concern nonroutine information susceptible to 
biases of the reporter. See Bertul, 664 P.2d at 1185. 
Other jurisdictions criticize Oates and instead distinguish 
between "law enforcement reports prepared in a routine, non-
adversrial setting, and those resulting from the arguably more 
subjective endeavor of investigating a crime and evaluating the 
results of that investigation." Quezada, 754 F.2d at 1194 
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(warrant of deportation admissible as public record); see also 
Christian, 895 P.2d at 682 (blood alcohol report admissible as 
public record). Further distinctions are drawn between reports 
prepared by detached public servants and employees vested with 
law enforcement power. See Christian, 895 P.2d at 681 (employee 
of N.M. health department); United States v. Rosa. 11 F.3d 315, 
331-32 (2d Cir. 1993) (employee of Medical Examiner's office); 
United States v. Blackburn, 992 F.2d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(chemist employed by private firm to conduct lensometer test). 
Even if this Court applies these distinctions, the report is 
still excluded by 803(8) (B) . First, as the State concedes, the 
report was prepared by a chemist from the state crime lab, an 
employee of a police department instrumentality whose express 
function is to test substances for purposes of prosecuting crime. 
See R.B. at 18; Utah Code Ann. § 53-5-104 (5)-(6) . By contrast, 
the report in Christian was prepared by a chemist employed by the 
New Mexico department of health. See Christian, 895 P.2d at 676. 
Likewise, the report at issue in Yacht Club was prepared by a 
chemist employed by the department of agriculture. See Yacht 
Club, 681 P.2d at 1227; see also Utah Code Ann. §§ 4-2-9, 4-2-10 
(1953 as amended). Such agencies are distinguishable because 
they are "not an arm of law enforcement and [their] employees are 
not law enforcement personnel." Christian, 895 P.2d at 676. 
Moreover, the report at issue here does not represent the 
sort of mechanical, routine, and non-adversarial information 
justified by Ouezada. Unlike the deportation warrant at issue in 
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Quezada, which contained unambiguous information including 
defendant's thumbprint and location of deportation, the 
information provided in the toxicology report was prepared in 
anticipation of litigation by an arm of law enforcement for the 
express purpose of prosecuting Rodriguez, thus raising concerns 
of its reliability. As noted in Peronek, such reports do "not 
materially differ from a crime report or other investigatory 
report expected to lead to some form of prosecutorial action." 
See Peronek, 803 P.2d at 1298 (jail report inadmissible under 
public record exception); see A.B. at 30-32 (full discussion of 
admissibility of toxicology report under Utah case law and Rule 
803(8) (B)) . Rather, the toxicology report here represents the 
more "traditional law enforcement function[] of observation and 
investigation of crime" where the chemist's perception may be 
clouded. 
In light of the foregoing, the report is excluded under Rule 
803(8)(B). The State does not address the admissibility of the 
report under the business record exception, Utah R. Evid 803(6), 
nor does the State assert that the report otherwise bears 
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Consequently, 
Rodriguez relies on his opening brief in stating that the report 
is likewise inadmissible as a business record and for lack of 
foundation which might otherwise establish the report's 
reliability. See A.B.at 23-30. 
D. THE TRIAL COURT ADMITTED THE TOXICOLOGY REPORT IN 
VIOLATION OF RODRIGUEZ'S RIGHTS OF CONFRONTATION. 
The State incorrectly asserts that confrontation rights do 
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not extend to preliminary hearings. The State relies upon 
Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1228 n.4 (citing Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 
120-22) for the proposition that federal confrontation clause 
rights do not extend to preliminary proceedings; and State v. 
Brooks. 638 P.2d 537, 542 (Utah 1981) for the assertion that 
confrontation rights under "Article I, Section 12 should be 
construed the same as the federal constitutional provision." See 
R.B. at 22. The State further contends that Anderson does not 
provide that full confrontation rights attach at a preliminary 
hearing, and, even if they do, that Anderson is implicitly 
overruled by Brooks. Id. 
First, Gerstein, as discussed supra note 1, is not 
controlling over preliminary examinations which operate as 
discovery and preservation devices, but rather applies only to 
Fourth Amendment probable cause determinations in support of 
pretrial custody. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 122-23. Coleman, 
rather, is controlling in this case where the preliminary 
hearing, as in Utah, is a critical, adversarial stage of the 
criminal proceeding. See Coleman, 3 99 U.S. at 9; Brickey, 714 
P.2d at 646. Insofar as rights may be impacted at a preliminary 
hearing, certain procedural protections are afforded a defendant 
as a matter of due process. Coleman 399 U.S. at 9 (right to 
counsel at preliminary hearing); Brickey, 714 P.2d at 646 
("proper consideration for defendant's constitutional rights"); 
Willet, 909 P.2d at 222 (cross-examination at preliminary hearing 
provides impeachment evidence at trial). 
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The Gerstein Court itself acknowledged this qualitative 
difference between a bare pretrial custody probable cause 
determination and the sort of adversarial preliminary hearing 
involved in Coleman, and so limited its own holding to Fourth 
Amendment probable cause determinations which are "addressed only 
to pretrial custody" and serve a "limited function and [are] 
nonadversary." Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 122-23 ("we limit our 
holding to the precise requirement of the Fourth Amendment"). To 
the extent that Utah's preliminary hearing is a critical, 
adversarial proceeding, Coleman, not Gerstein, is controlling. 
Moreover, to the extent that Coleman is grounded in due 
process confrontation rights, the Utah Supreme Court's holding in 
State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981) instructs that the 
level of federal confrontation rights afforded at a "critical" 
preliminary examination should likewise be extended at a 
"critical" preliminary examination under Article I, §12. Id. at 
542 (state confrontation rights are equivalent to federal 
confrontation rights). By the same token, Anderson is still good 
law. Anderson comports with Utah and federal case law which 
acknowledges that a criminal defendant is entitled to a fair 
preliminary hearing where, as in Utah, such hearing is a critical 
stage. As stated by the Anderson Court, 
the right of confrontation at the preliminary examination 
merely demands that the prosecution's use of hearsay 
evidence at the hearing may not circumvent the defendant's 
substantive rights to a fair hearing and a fair trial by 
denying the defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the 
witnesses who offer testimony at the hearing. 
To this end, confrontation rights do attach, even if not the full 
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scope of such rights as applied at trial. 
In light of the foregoing, Rodriguez's confrontation rights 
were violated by the admission of the toxicology report. See 
A.B. at 32-37. The report, an unsworn document, was admitted 
without the accompanying testimony of the preparer. In addition, 
the State did not offer any evidence establishing the reliability 
of the testing procedures, nor the qualifications of the chemist. 
In the absence of the preparer or other reliability evidence, 
Rodriguez was stripped of even the minimum opportunity of 
rebuttal. Consequently, Rodriguez was denied his right of 
confronting the evidence against him. R. 70. Hence, the 
toxicology report was not "reliable hearsay" where even the 
slightest indicia of reliability were lacking. R. 70-71. 
E. WITHOUT THE TOXICOLOGY REPORT, THERE IS INSUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE BINDOVER DETERMINATION. 
There was insufficient evidence to bind this case over on a 
charge of possession, which requires a finding of a knowing and 
intentional possession of a controlled substance. See 58-37-
8(2) (a) (i) (1996) . As discussed above, the toxicology report was 
inadmissible hearsay. In addition, Rodriguez's statement was 
admitted in violation of the corpus delicti rule. See A.B. 38. 
The corpus delicti rule, a rule of evidence, applies to 
preliminary hearings pursuant to Rule 7(h)(1), Utah R. Crim. P. 
("preliminary examination shall be held under the rules and laws 
applicable to criminal cases tried before a court" and Rule 
1101(b), Utah R. Evid. (providing exclusive list of situations 
where evidence rules do not apply without mentioning preliminary 
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hearings except with regard to "reliable hearsay"). The corpus 
delicti rule requires that before a defendant's statement may be 
admitted the state must show by clear and convincing evidence 
that (i) a wrong was done and (ii) such wrong was the result of 
criminal conduct. State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1162, 1164 
(Utah 1992)2. 
The balance of evidence presented by the State does not meet 
this standard. The officers' statements indicating that they saw 
the baggie sticking out of Rodriguez's pocket and Schow's belief 
that the substance therein was "consistent" with cocaine was 
insufficient to establish that Rodriguez was in possession of a 
controlled substance. Other evidence is necessary to establish 
the substance as cocaine. 
Schow's identification was, at best, speculative and 
inconclusive. He could not categorically identify the cocaine, 
and even admitted that at times he confused cocaine with baking 
soda. See A.B. 39; R. 62-64. So shaky was his identification 
that the trial court struck his identifying testimony at trial. 
R. 62-64. Without other competent, corroborative evidence, 
Schow's testimony was insufficient to establish the substance 
2
 This standard is consistent with the bindover standard, 
which requires a "quantum of evidence sufficient to warrant 
submission of the case to the trier of fact." State v. Pledger, 
896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995). To the extent that the corpus 
delicti rule merely requires the state to establish that a wrong 
was done and the wrong was the result of criminal activity by 
evidence independent of the defendant's statement, the bindover 
standard likewise requires the state to establish evidence beyond 
that which is "wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable 
inference to prove some issue" in the state's case. Id. 
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found on Rodriguez as cocaine. C.f. Provo City Corp. v. Spotts. 
861 P.2d 437 (Utah App. 1993)(possession established where 
officer recognized pot, saw defendant smoking it, cigarette was 
short and disintegrated rapidly, method of inhalation was 
consistent with pot smoking, officer smelled the pot). 
The State asserts that Schow's identification, albeit 
unsound, nonetheless supports a reasonable inference that the 
substance was cocaine. In Pledger, the Supreme Court found that 
an officer's speculation that a sodomy victim was under 18 years 
of age, the statutory age limit, was sufficient to bind the case 
over to the trial court. Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229-30. Schow's 
speculative guess at the identity of the substance is 
distinguishable given the likelihood of mistaken identification. 
Baking soda, a white powder substance, is easily confused with 
cocaine, another white powder substance; without special training 
and proper testing equipment, cocaine is difficult to identify by 
sight. In Pledger, on the other hand, it was unlikely that the 
officer would mistake the juvenile male for a male over eighteen 
years of age. "Given the pattern of physical development among 
young boys, it is unlikely that Officer Banks would have 
mistakenly identified an eighteen-year-old boy as being 
fourteen." Given the high probability of mistaken 
identification, Schow's testimony does not support the reasonable 
inference necessary to support the bindover. 
Moreover, Rodriguez's identifying statement did not support 
Schow's testimony such that the bindover determination was 
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proper. Under Johnson, the "corpus delicti must be established 
through evidence, independent of the confession or admission, 
that 'the injury specified . . . occurred, and that such injury 
was caused by someone's criminal conduct." Johnson, 821 P.2d at 
1162 (Quotation omitted). Schow's testimony along with the 
testimony asserting that the substance fell from Rodriguez's 
person does not independently establish possession of a 
controlled substance; the identity of the substance remained in 
question. As such, the only evidence identifying the substance 
as cocaine was Rodriguez's statement, and identification may not 
be premised on a defendant's statement standing alone. 
In light of the foregoing, the bindover was not supported by 
sufficient evidence, even under the relaxed bindover standard. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Rodriguez requests this court to 
overturn his conviction based on the district court's erroneous 
dismissal of his motion to quash bindover and motion to suppress 
evidence seized pursuant to an illegal search. 
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